Had Andrey actually planned to kill the judge he would have had plenty of time (and the axe) on his hands. However, he allowed a surprisingly long amount of time for the court security to rush into the judge's office and detain him. Witnesses described him as "looking happy and accomplished" during the detention. The story itself seems merely "amusing," but the internet comments on the Russian websites are truly prolific. Having browsed through hundreds of comments and talked to a few Russians, I haven't found a single one condemning Andrey's actions. Quite the opposite; the Russian Internet made Andrey an overnight hero and led to fulsome calls for Russians to rise up and "kill them all with axes, forks, and chains" like in the good old times. One commenter says that "Andrey will get 10 years [in prison], had he axed her - he would've gotten 15 - extra five to finish off the corrupt judge who listens to Papa Vladimir would've been a good investment!" A few commenters think that the attack was a United Russia-administered conspiracy to show how violent the opposition can be. Whatever the truth is, the insinuation is obvious - progressive, Internet-using Russians endorse a violent solution to Russia's political stagnation. Those who've read Russian history books know that paranoia from any side is not a good social tendency for the Motherland.

The elections in Russia are over, but the post-elections tensions are still high (if not higher) than during the February and March demonstrations. Now that Putin is officially the new president, society has clashed over the statements and direction of the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian society has actively split into haves and have-nots, liberals (anything but Putin) and conservatives (better Putin than unknown), and internationalists and nationalists. How did it happen?

Two events have emerged into the spotlight simultaneously. The Russian Orthodox Church and its Patriarch Kirill have been actively supportive of Putin and made statements during and after the elections that have reached far beyond church's business. As a response, on March 3rd, members of a controversial band, "Pussy Riot," stripped naked in Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior, making a statement that their behavior was equally inappropriate inside the church as is the church's behavior in public. They were arrested and are still being held in jail awaiting a closed trial. In another situation, there was no jail time for a much more serious offense. A United Russia member of parliament Alexey Zheludkov, while driving drunk in Saratov Oblast last week, hit and killed a 13-year-old boy on a bicycle. The MP is back home, stripped of his rights to international travel, and faces five years in prison as the highest measure of punishment. In addition to the aforementioned controversy and injustice, the public also had a chance to recall that Patriarch Kirill (legal name Vladimir Gundyaev, former KGB code name "Mikhailov") in fact is a billionaire who made his fortune in alcohol and tobacco imports in the Nineties using Orthodox Church's non-profit tax-exemptions status.

All of the above was placed into the internet and media "blender" and created the unforeseen headache recipe for the church and for the ruling party.

A country, starving for true Faith after nearly a century without Christianity, deserves better than that. One of my Russian friends, who recently went back to her Siberian hometown, approached a local priest after the service for a blessing. The pastor asked my friend whether she went to church when she lived in America. She said "yes, but not Orthodox." The priest condemned her as sinner destined to living in hell. My PhD-level-educated friend told rather loudly to the Orthodox priest that, in fact, she knows that Jesus is the only way to salvation which He had specifically made clear through the book called Bible, and that the Father of the Orthodox church may be the one heading to a hot dark place himself if he keeps up his unholy behavior inside of the holy place. Friend's loud statement was heard by many at the church and caused a long-lasting pause and silent, red-faced rage of anger from the priest.

Tsar Putin and Father Kirill may have Russia's best interests at heart. However, they need to understand that people travel, read, communicate, and Catherine the Great's times aren't coming back. They really cannot control nation's mindset through empty promises and faulty religious statements. Putin, as a politician, can afford doing it. Russian Orthodox Church should beware.

Russian presidential elections are over, but the hype around them is not. To figure out what really happened in Russia, I've talked to several friends in Moscow and St. Petersburg; some of them served as the elections observers on behalf of the opposition, others were just common voters. Here's what they said:

Observer 1 (Moscow): "I was an election observer yesterday - we finished counting @5am and at my particular school [elections are hosted at public schools] Prokhorov won with 37% while Putin came in 2nd with 35%..... Putin "eighn't" that popular if one actually counts the votes..."

Observer 2 (Moscow suburbs): "Putin did in fact get way more than 60%. The drop-boxes were transparent; there was no way to cheat at our location. I couldn't believe my eyes - just how many people were voting for Putin..."

Voter 1: Yes, maybe we [the opposition] are just one percent, but it starts with a small intellectual group in the city, and spreads into the villages. That's how governments are changed. Putin's got 1.5 to 5 years left at the most!

Voter 2: I haven't voted in 20 years, because have always believed that my vote doesn't matter. This time, I felt obligated to get out and vote, for Putin! I couldn't let those big-mouth crazies have a real shot at leading our country.

As one of my friends noted: "35% of the country works hard, and the other 65% lives on the hand-outs or works for the government, thus the vote!" Chechens are, indeed, crazy about Putin (where he earned 100% of the vote). The logic is simple: a war-torn region receives incredible federal funding, and today Grozny with its designer boutiques looks more like Dubai or Beverly Hills than Grozny. Kremlin's logic in giving away the money? It's cheaper than fighting a war with Islamic terrorists. No matter what Quran says, everyone likes a big house, green lawn, Ralph Lauren polos, a shiny Mercedes, and a good massage at a spa. Seems like giving those things to Chechen radical islamists did the job of de-radicalizing them.

What's next? Russia Blog tends to disagree with the mainstream Western media. Putin's rule is not going to get harder and more authoritarian. There just simply is no reason for that! In many ways, majority of the voters who casted their ballots for Putin would've loved to see a strong Russian hand rise again. However, now that the opposition has shown its political youth and lack of real power, and the instability in the Middle East continues to increase gas prices and balance Kremlin's books, we will most likely witness the further stagnation in Kremlin and the Russian economy.

Main reasons to vote for Putin? "Stability" and "who else if not him?" As my Moscow friend's older family members explained: "you [the younger generation] haven't lived through World War II and haven't lost your lifetime savings in 1991 and again in 1998. Putin is stable, and we have enough now." You can add to this list of Russian nation's bad luck the Mongolian invasion, Ivan the Terrible, a line of brutal tsars who kept the slavery of the Russian nation legal through 1861, then World War I, Communist Revolution, Cold War, and deprivation of the Yeltsin's years. This makes Putin look like George Washington (if not Jesus) altogether.

In fact, Putin has benefited greatly from the protests. At the end of the day, he can sincerely claim that opposition in Russia is allowed and lives a vibrant life and the elections will be fair (there is just too much attention from all sides of the fence). And, most importantly, the young opposition (which is driven and educated but severely outnumbered by the old Soviet generations) assisted Putin in playing the class-war card in the upcoming elections.

To top it off, Putin's luck never runs out. By vetoing the U.N. Syria resolution and being ambiguous about Iran's nuclear program, Russia has contributed to the great instability in the Middle East, which means high oil prices. High oil prices mean great things for Putin: 2.5% of debt to GDP ratio, tripling (!!!) salaries of the military since January, and vibrant social programs (handouts).

In general, Russians are tired of Vlad. However, aside from pure luck, he performs the basic managerial functions of leading the country, and no one else seems to be capable to take his role at the moment. Recent public debates have shown Zhirinovsky's irrelevance bordering with insanity. In the past, his semi-fascist, racial, nationalistic slurs were funny or had a grain of truth in them. Now, he looked just like an old irrelevant Yeltsin-era dinosaur. Zyuganov is a communist, and there is no return to that. Then, there is nobody else who has any type of public recognition to attract any significant vote. Tired of Putin or not, someone has to wake up and lead the country. After Russia's presidential elections 2012, Putin will.

MOSCOW, March 2 -- Judging by the statements of not a few U.S. politicians and journalists, the United States has a keen interest in the presidential election now under way in Russia. Moreover, many in Washington are loath to see Vladimir Putin return to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, for a variety of moral and practical reasons, the United States would be well-advised to avoid getting overly involved in this election.

The word "moral" sounds like an oxymoron in connection with electoral politics. A look at past and current election campaigns in the United States, particularly presidential ones, should stifle any temptation to set up U.S. elections as a shining example for other countries to follow. Colorful, grandiose and fascinating they may be, but -- an example for others to follow? Central to these campaigns is the amount of money raised and spent, much of it on smearing one's opponent. Is this what we would like to teach the Russians through "democracy promotion" programs paid for by the U.S. taxpayer?

Ironically, we pay for these programs by borrowing money from China, which lags way behind Russia in its democratic development.

There are, of course, exceptions to Jefferson's sage advice. For example, when a state poses a threat to the security and vital interests of the United States, such interference is not only permissible but positively necessary.

Undeniably, the Soviet Union constituted such a threat and so interference in its internal affairs was perfectly justified. The Voice of America, the BBC, Radio Liberty, clandestine shipments of banned literature to the Soviet Union and other similar acts were part and parcel of the ideological struggle against communism.

By the same token, the Soviet Union, despite its much lower standard of living, spent even more money interfering in U.S. internal affairs than the United States did in the Soviet Union's, including the bankrolling of the U.S. Communist Party, much of the peace movement and other leftist initiatives.

Today, however, Russia and the United States are no longer enemies. Moreover, we are partners in many areas, including the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, countering international terrorism, space exploration, and much more.

Russia today does not interfere in U.S. internal affairs and America would do well to show Russia the same consideration. Such interference only undermines our own interests as it antagonizes Russians -- the people as well as the leadership -- and pushes them into the outstretched arms of China.

New York University Professor Stephen Cohen, a foremost expert on U.S.-Russia relations, recently stated at a Washington roundtable discussion that Washington has squandered numerous opportunities to improve relations with Moscow since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

Specifically, while Russia extended cooperation to the U.S. military for operations in Afghanistan following the al-Qaida-led attacks against America, Washington thumbed its nose at Moscow by interfering in political matters in former Soviet republics in Central Asia, insisting on expanding NATO to Russia's borders, canceling the AMB treaty and ramping up plans for missile defense in Eastern Europe.

While Russia respected and recognized America's security concerns post-9/11, the same courtesy has not been extended by the White House to the Kremlin.

It is time for America to stop wasting any further opportunities for building a strong, lasting relationship with Moscow and embrace Russia as a worthy and reliable strategic partner in meeting the challenge posed by a rising China and resurgent Islamic extremism.

But, in order to have a relationship built on mutual trust and respect, let's let Russians take care of Russia's future.

The United States and other Western countries should focus on developing positive and fruitful cooperation with Russia in a variety of fields -- economics, security, science, technology, and cultural exchange -- and on working effectively with the leaders Russians choose without outside interference.

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of the Department of World Politics at the Moscow State University.

"We wish not to meddle with the internal affairs of any country..."
-- President Thomas Jefferson

The US foreign policy establishment tirelessly propagates a false narrative about Vladimir Putin as a ruthless autocrat who stole the recent State Duma elections, and strives morning, noon and night to revive the old Soviet Union. The language used even by high-ranking US diplomats is sometimes scarcely distinguishable from name-calling. In view of Putin's high ratings among the Russian electorate -- approaching 60% and rising -- one wonders how we are going to manage our relationship with Russia after March 4th when it is widely expected that Putin will almost certainly return to the Kremlin.

The same members of our bipartisan establishment who denounce Putin for his alleged autocratic ways cheered Boris Yeltsin to the rafters when he shelled Russia's legitimately elected parliament into submission, imposed a presidential constitution on the nation (in a Leninist-style revolution from above), ruled by decree, and stole the 1996 presidential election outright with the help of crony oligarchs.

His skepticism about Russia's prospects under pax Americana is certainly justified: he is well aware of the dismal results of our "color revolutions" in post-Soviet space. In the Middle East, our interventionism in the name of democracy and "progress" has fomented Sharia law, anti-Christian violence and the diminution of the status of women. Ironically, whereas "democratic" Egypt arrested members of the International Republican Institute (IRI) for promoting democracy, in "autocratic" Russia both IRI and National Democratic Institute (NDI) operate freely.

Our "progressive" elite is playing with fire. We risk blowback on a variety of fronts for our ceaseless interventionism in an ever-expanding number of countries and regions. To make matters worse, we are on the verge of fiscal collapse from our simultaneous pursuit of welfare at home and strategic dominance abroad.

In this spirit, Secretary of State Clinton branded the State Duma elections of last December 4th as "neither free nor fair" even before the election was over and the votes counted.

There is another possible narrative about the Duma elections:

- For the first time in Russian history, a ruling party was rebuked at the polls, effectively losing the election.

- Despite clear evidence of ballot stuffing, the final result conformed broadly to exit and pre-election polls.

- Authorities permitted massive public protests against the results, which were covered live on national television - hardly the stuff of autocracy.

Time for a new narrative about Russia and Putin that corresponds to reality:

- Reagan and Gorbachev worked to end the Cold War so that Russia could free itself from the depredations of Communism, and rejoin the pan-European family of nations in a new entente spanning the Northern Hemisphere.

- Russia's transition away from totalitarianism has been slow and painful, but it proceeds apace.

- Putin, whatever his faults, has done much to restore his nation to peace, prosperity and normalcy -- just as Adenauer and De Gasperi did after the collapse of totalitarianism in Germany and Italy, respectively.

It is time for America to embrace Russia as a worthy and reliable strategic partner in meeting the challenge posed by a rising China and resurgent Islamic extremism. We should also honor our longstanding promise to lift Jackson-Vanik trade discrimination against Russia, which President Obama could accomplish without the vote in Congress with the stroke of a pen.

It may seem a pipedream that moderation and realism should come to guide US foreign policy after a long hiatus, but hard fiscal realities may soon give us little choice. US indebtedness is now quickly approaching the mind-boggling sum of $16 trillion -- well over 100% of GDP -- putting us in the same neighborhood as Greece (compared, incidentally, to Russia's 11%).

If our leaders were guided by the classical virtues of justice, prudence, magnanimity and love of country they would have long since ditched our destructive and costly bid for global dominance. Only dire economic realities, it would seem, are capable of forcing their hand.

The leaders of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 80s failed to heed the warning bells set off by overextension, stagnation and economic decline, and were unceremoniously swept away. May our leaders, beset by the same kinds of dangers today, come to grips with the stark realities facing us before it is too late.

James George Jatras is the former Foreign Policy Analyst, U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, former U.S. Foreign Service Officer

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of the Department of World Politics at the Moscow State University.

Anthony T. Salvia is the former Special Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (appointee of President Ronald Reagan)

The reason for this is clear and fundamental: Russia as a whole is solidly pro-Putin (Levada Center which, by the way, is funded in part by US, puts his current rating at 60 percent, and rising), just as Putin is forever pro-Russia. The Western-leaning intelligentsia, the "office plankton" and the "cultured bourgeoisie" that set the tone for the current anti-Putin protests represent just a sliver of Russian society. If truth be told, this "elite" is basically inimical to Russia's masses.

People have long memories, and the contrast between the state of affairs under Yeltsin and in Putin's time is too fresh and too glaring. Then, people used to wait for months for their wages, salaries and pensions. Putin put an end to all that - delay of payment of wages is now a criminal offense.

Also, Gaidar's reforms under Yeltsin virtually wiped out the Soviet middle class. In the past decade it has been reborn and is now groping for political expression.

Putin also made the regional elites toe the line - he stopped all that nonsense about a Ural Republic, a Far Eastern Republic, an independent Tatarstan, etc. Russia's people still feel nostalgia for "Great Russia," the Soviet Union. Putin clearly has an empathy with this feeling. Hence the name he gave the party he put together - United Russia. The people may have doubts and suspicions about the party, but not about the idea, no sir.

OK, Putin is accused of autocratic tendencies, of being a strongman, and so on. The real question here is, would the Russian people wish to have a weak man, a laisser-faire gentleman as their national leader? Anyone who knows anything about Russians knows the answer to that. Putin himself has often rebuked his people for their paternalistic tendencies, and he knows what he is talking about.

Curiously, accusations of autocracy and such are freely and incessantly voiced in the media, on the internet and at rallies that no self-respecting autocrat would stand for a moment.

In short, whatever negative tsunami about Putin is flooding the media (and some of the stories might be true) one should admit these simple truths: never before in Russia's history has the country been so free, nor has such a large part of its population lived so well.

There is at least one big blot on "Putin's regime" in the eyes of both the people and the opposition: pervading corruption. Considering the vast size of the problem, all one can say here is - it's not a job for one man, however strong. The "tandem" does what it can, firing corrupt governors (more than a third of them in the last few years) and letting whistle-blowers like Aleksei Navalny blow their whistles unhindered. On the other hand, one can only imagine what howls would be raised in Russia and abroad if Putin were to adopt some Chinese-style or Stalinist methods of dealing with corruption. Politics are the art of the possible.

Earlier we spoke of Putin's empathy with the people. Nowhere is it more striking than in the Russians' attitude toward the West. It is a well-known fact that after the downfall of Communism the Russian people went through a period of high euphoria about rejoining the European family of nations, naively expecting to be welcomed as long lost brothers.

The West quickly disabused them of these sentimental notions. Seeing Russia as merely the loser in the Cold War, the West proceeded to treat it as a vanquished nation. Despite promises given to Gorbachev, NATO expanded eastwards, incorporating not just former Warsaw Pact members but also some Soviet republics.

Culturally, Russians experienced quite a shock, too. After all, Russia is a country with a thousand-year-long history, a former empire with a long and brilliant record of military conquests, a direct heir to Byzantium in terms of culture and religion, a mighty contributor to world's science, literature, music, and the arts; it has led the world in space exploration and presently the United States is relying on Russia to deliver supplies to the International Space Station. And here came a horde of advisers, consultants and businessmen, and proclaimed their intention to "civilize" Russia! Sure Russians felt as resentful as a bear with a sore head.

Putin naturally shared that resentment. Still, according to a view most widespread in Russia, Putin started his first term in the Kremlin with at least two major goals in mind: saving Russia from total collapse - which he did -- and making his country an integral part of the Western alliance, including joining NATO.

It is a fact that Putin's earliest offer for Russia to join NATO was haughtily rebuffed by the then NATO general secretary George Robertson. The same policy has continued to this day, though there has been continuous talk of Ukraine and Georgia "eventually" joining NATO - presumably because their leaders, Saakashvili and the "orange revolutionary" Yushchenko made hatred for Russia the mainstay of their national policies.

There have been other overtures by Putin to bring Russia into closer alliance with the West, as when he offered unstinting support for the USA and NATO in their assault on Afghanistan after 9/11. And what has been the response - further NATO expansion to the East and an ever tighter "missile-defense" in Europe, right in Russia's backyard.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that, had the US and the UK accepted and helped Putin's efforts, had they met him less than halfway even, the history of the first decade of the 21st century and after would be quite different. Things would be a lot more beneficent for Western security and economy.

Other European countries, those of Old Europe, were in fact ready to embrace Russia. However, the two major players unfortunately rebuffed Putin quite unceremoniously. That made him - and most Russians - very bitter. So if there has been a reversal to a Cold War atmosphere, the West should obviously share the blame, at least to some extent, for the current sad state of affairs.

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of the Department of World Politics at the Moscow State University.

Ambassador McFaul's or Mike's, as friends and colleagues call him, first steps on arrival in Moscow were marked by a mammoth scandal in the media, internet, Duma and elsewhere. However, it is my strong suspicion that Mike felt victim to some intrigues in the higher places in Washington.

McFaul's record is well-known and pretty illustrious: a Stanford man, about the best Slavist and Russian specialist (some say, Russophile) America has to offer, author of numerous monographs on Russia, etc. etc. Politically he is best known - one might say renowned -- as architect of the "reset" policy in the relations between the USA and Russia, President Obama's helpmeet in the difficult task of straightening out those relations that cried to be straightened out.

All that, however, belongs to his life and times before he donned diplomatic togs. As a diplomat, McFaul has to be part of - and be held responsible for - acts and situations for which he would presumably hate to be held accountable. This article is not an attempt to endorse all McFaul views since I often disagreed with him in the past but if one takes into account the current highly negative atmosphere towards Russia in Washington Mike is probably not the worst option.

However, meeting them on the first or second day of his new post in the Spaso House and in the middle of highly emotional Russian presidential campaign is totally out of question. That is if he did not get a direct order from his superiors.

After that ill-fated meeting McFaul has been saying to all who will listen that he had nothing to do with it, that he was merely accompanying, according to protocol, his boss William Burns, that he kept silent throughout that meeting merely listening, etc. etc.

However, although it is true that Burns was in charge of this meeting to believe that it was his idea is even more impossible.

William Burns is one of the best and most qualified American diplomats with the extraordinary experience in Russian affairs. Even if he had a high fever that day he would never dream up a potential huge and embarrassing conflict with the same Kremlin leaders with whom Washington would have to deal at least for the next six years.

That leaves Burn's boss Hillary Clinton who presumably ordered the welcoming reception for opposition - as a poke in Putin's eye for his charge that the recent rallies in Moscow in the wake of elections to the Duma were inspired and in part instigated by Madam Secretary and other "democracy promoters" in Washington.

All these intrigues do not augur too well for the new ambassador's career in Moscow - the political constraints are too harsh. Fresh proof of this came with certain aspects of President Obama's latest State of the Union address. McFaul had confidently predicted that in that address Obama would announce Russia's graduation from the infamous Jackson-Vanik amendment. This did not happen despite McFaul's strong recommendation - apparently because Obama did not want to enter into another fight with Congress over this matter.

It is clear that Michael McFaul as an intellectual free to study his chosen field and Michael McFaul as a cog in the byzantine diplomatic machine are two different personas.

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of the Department of World Politics at the Moscow State University.

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of the Department of World Politics at the Moscow State University.

Anthony T. Salvia is the former Special Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (appointee of President Ronald Reagan)

A reform-minded Russian blogger, Alexei Novalny, was the target of a photoshopping scam that tried to link him to the discredited plutocrat Boris Bereshovsky. It looks like something the old KGB might have done, so fingers pointed to the Kremlin where Novalny's blog have been unwelcome lately. To retaliate against whoever smeared him, Mr. Navalny ran the real picture, which showed him standing with presumptive Presidential candidate Mikhail Prokhorov, a likely rival for Vladimir Putin in the March 4 elections. Then Novalny photoshopped a hilarious procession of other figures--from Stalin and Napoleon to Putin himself to even a Space Alien. And posted them on his blog.

The message: in the age of the Internet you can't photoshop as in days of old. Come clean!

The Putin regime has little to fear from the latest public protests which, despite drawing large crowds, are apolitical. True politics will only become possible in Russia when both the opposition and the regime focus on the tedious work of practical politics, says Nicolai N. Petro in his highly personal view of recent events.

Kudos are due to both the Russian police and opposition leaders for having managed the second successful mass protest in Moscow without incident and in an appropriately festive spirit. After the Christmas eve demonstration in Sakharov square, the crowd was told that the next protest meeting would be held some time in February since, obviously, nobody wants to disrupt the extended Russian winter holidays which last well into January. By February, presumably, holiday cheer will have subsided and it will be time for another manifestation of civic outrage. As Putin quipped during his televised Q&A with the nation, if these protests are a product of 'the Putin regime,' he is only too happy to take credit for them.

All this mock civility suggests just how smoldering this 'protest of the satiated,' to use journalist Andrei Kolesnikov's memorable phrase, truly is. The opposition and the regime are shadow boxers in a co-dependent relationship. They joust, they jab, yet they also need each other to survive.

The organizers of the Moscow rally estimated the number of participants from 100 000 to 120,000. Nationalist, liberal and communist groups and activists could be seen there but the main part of the crowd was Moscow's educated middle class.

For now, at least, the Putin regime is quite comfortable with such protests. First, because they are an argument for pushing through the reforms that president Dmitry Medvedev has been promoting these past four years.

'...the only thing that the protesters seem to have in common is a deep loathing for all things political, including all political leaders and all political parties. This contempt is not reserved just for Putin and United Russia. It assails the very notion of politics as careful social management or, to use Max Weber's words, as 'the strong and slow boring of hard boards, managed with both passion and perspective.'
Almost overnight Medvedev was able to produce proposals that vastly simplified procedures for registering political parties and reintroduced gubernatorial elections, making it is clear that these initiatives had been in the pipeline for quite some time and could be 'pulled off the shelf' at a moment's notice.

Far from objecting to these rallies, as the Kremlin's former chief ideologist Vladislav Surkov explained to the newspaper Izvestia, the regime expects to benefit from them. By demonstrating that 'even strong turbulence is . . . but a variant of stability,' Russia can show that it is as resilient as any traditional democracy. In fact, the government and the opposition actually share the same values, which is why the government is doing everything in its power to recapture 'the moral high ground' by fostering 'renewed, open, honest political institutions that people can understand.' If public discontent were to be quelled by force, it would play into the hands of the opponents of modernization, but so would political apathy. What reformers in the Kremlin want, therefore, is an impressive, but peaceful, display of civic activism that puts continued pressure on recalcitrant bureaucrats. Surkov then went out of his way to thank the protesters for demonstrating such initiative. 'If you think strategically,' he says, 'and listen to the minority, you will find tomorrow's leaders among them."'1]

While Surkov's reasoning is clearly self-serving, there is another reason why the regime is at ease with the current protests--they pose no threat to the regime because they lack any actionable political agenda.

Take a look at the five demands of the opposition: immediate freedom for all political prisoners and 'those unfairly convicted,' revocation of the last election results, the firing of the head of the Central Election Commission, the registration of 'all opposition parties' by February, and the holding of 'new, open, and fair elections.' Each demand sounds reasonable, but could only be imposed by fiat. And since these demands are specifically tailored to suit the opposition, it would undermine any semblance of impartiality on the part of government institutions. This is the exact opposite of the rule of law that Russia needs.

Yet it could hardly be otherwise, for the only thing that the protesters seem to have in common is a deep loathing for all things political, including all political leaders and all political parties. This contempt is not reserved just for Putin and United Russia. It assails the very notion of politics as careful social management or, to use Max Weber's words, as 'the strong and slow boring of hard boards, managed with both passion and perspective.' [2]

This indictment, by the way, comes not from one of Putin's cronies, but from Nikita Belykh [14], the former head of the Union of Right Forces, who resigned in 2008 rather than see the party become a Kremlin 'project.' He later accepted President Medvedev's offer to become governor of the Kirov region. Two years in government, he says, have opened his eyes to a lot of things, including the paternalism that pervades Russian politics in both its official and opposition versions. He seems to suggest that the opposition has yet to develop the courage and maturity needed to enter the political arena. Could the impressive mass protests of December 2011 help to overcome this? So far the signs are not good.

Five groups of the protest movement

As presently constituted, the protest movement can be divided into roughly five groups:

(1) The most popular group consists of artists, poets, television personalities, writers, and journalists. People like Artemy Troitsky, who came to the last rally dressed as a condom, Leonid Parfyonov [15], Boris Akunin [16], Dmitry Bykov [17], Olga Romanova [18], singer Alexei Kortnev, and socialite Kseniya Sobchak [19]. They all make it a point, however, to declare that they are 'non-political,' that their concern is to give the nation back its 'moral voice.'

2) Another large group at these protests have been Russian nationalists like Vladimir Tor, and 'true communists' like Sergei Udaltsov [20]. Udaltsov, a scion of the Old Bolshevik elite--one of Moscow's streets is named after his great-grandfather--parted ways with other communist organizations when the failed to adequately reflect, in his view, worker's interests. His latest project, the Russian United Labor Front--Left Front [21], also objects to mere party politics and calls for power to be transferred directly to the working masses. Tor, on the other hand, is one of the perennial leaders of the right wing 'Russian March,' which also counts blogger Alexei Navalny among its participants.[3] He also abjures the divisive term 'party politics', preferring to speak on behalf of the whole Russian nation.

While many at Sakharov Square might wish to distance the protests from his appeal 'Russia for Russians,' as Tor pointed in his address to the crowd, the nationalist protesters in Manezh square in Moscow who battled riot police last February [22] share one important bond with the current protests--an uncompromising hostility to political authority. 'Without the heroes of Manezh,' Tor reminded the audience, 'there would never have been a Bolotnaya.'[4]

(3) Smaller in number, but much better known, are the perennial leaders of the Old Opposition, figures like Vladimir Ryzhkov, Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Garry Kasparov, and Grigory Yavlinsky. While some have worked in the government, they have all publicly broken with Putin, and now demand that the entire political system be reconstituted. Their personal ambitions have prevented them from agreeing on a common political strategy, much less a joint list of candidates. As a result, while theoretically they could represent the beginnings of a political opposition, in practice they have placed themselves at a safe remove from the political process.

The blogger and anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny was released from prison on 20 Dec, four days before the Moscow rally. He was jailed for 15 days for marching in one of the previous unsanctioned opposition protests. 'I see enough people here to take the Kremlin and the White House right now, but we are a peaceful force,' Alexei Navalny told the crowd. (Photo: drugoi.livejournal)

(4) A fourth group is one I call the new Internet Opposition. It is composed of people like Alexei Navalny, Evgenia Chirikova, Grigory Melkonyants, and Ilya Yashin, who have developed a core following among Russia's rapidly burgeoning internet community. Navalny is the most charismatic of this group. He has made clear that he considers himself a politician, and that he will run for office (under a different system). For now, however, his political views are hard to pin down. He is all things to all people, refusing, for example, to even discuss whether a (hypothetical) political party he might lead would be on the left or the right side of the political spectrum.[5]

With the exception of Navalny and Yashin, who were once active in Yabloko (Navalny also served briefly as an advisor to Belykh in Kirov), their rise to prominence has been largely due to persecution by the authorities and devotion for a single cause, be it corruption, the environment, or election monitoring. Their persecution has garnered them "street cred," but not much else. Some in the Old Opposition thinks these youngsters look to them for guidance, and that they will ride into political office on the latter's coat tails. I very much doubt it.

(5) The latest addition to protest movement are individuals who have been part of, or directly benefited from, the Putin regime but have since abandoned it. They include former finance minister Alexei Kudrin, oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, and "A Just Russia" deputy Ilya Ponomarev. While they too reject the Old Opposition and share the values of the Internet Opposition, at the last two mass rallies they were met by resounding disapproval. Prokhorov, for example, chose not to address the crowd in Sakharov Square after being hectored by shouts of "Go back to Courchevel"--the Swiss ski resort favoured by Russian nouveau riches. The crowd's antipathy to individuals with practical political experience are once again on full display here.

Thus, by default, the government retains the sole practical political agenda and, as such, its dominance is unassailable. It can easily afford to wait for opposition leaders to devour each other as they have so often in the past. It can then step in to co-opt the best and the brightest by giving them the opportunity to apply themselves in the only meaningful political game in town.

'... the government retains the sole practical political agenda and, as such, its dominance is unassailable. It can easily afford to wait for opposition leaders to devour each other as they have so often in the past.'
Despite what opposition leaders may say, the fault for this lies primarily with them. They have ritualistically rejected any meaningful political dialogue with the government, despite the fact that under president Medvedev attempts were regularly made to set the stage for a liberal political party. But no matter what the Kremlin did to encourage the emergence of such a party--simplifying party registration, reducing the percentage quota for a parliamentary seat from seven to a five percent minimum, guaranteeing federal funding and air time to parties that get even three percent of the popular vote--the opposition has been either unable or unwilling to assume its proper political role in a democracy, that of constructive gadfly.

Those few opposition leaders who have accepted the challenge of constructing real political life from the ground up, however, have found the current regime to be, if not a friend, then at least a receptive partner. Asked about his differences with his former aide Alexei Navalny, Nikita Belykh summed them up as follows: 'By my actions I am attempting to mitigate the crisis [of confidence in government] and improve relations between government and society. He is attempting to tear apart what connections remain.'[6]

Belykh did not attend the meeting on Sakharov Square in Moscow. Instead, he attended the rally in Kirov and spoke to a small crowd of opposition supporters that gathered there. His impromptu remarks were an appeal for the kind of personal civic engagement that could transform 'opposition to everything' into a true revival of politics. "I believe that civic activism must be constructive in nature, not destructive. In my opinion, the government took a step in our direction today. A major and truly significant step. And we need to seize this opportunity, instead of telling the government to go to hell. The ball, he says, 'is now in society's court.'[7]

Dr. Nicolai N. Petro is professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island. He is the author or editor of eight books on Russia, including Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod has Coped with Rapid Social Change (Cornell University Press, 2004), The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture (Harvard, 1995), and Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State co-authored with Alvin Z. Rubinstein (Longman, 1997). He served as special assistant on Soviet affairs in the U.S. Department of State in 1989-1990, and as advisor to the mayor of the Russian city of Novgorod the Great in 2001-2002. His web site is www.npetro.net.

This article was first published by Open Democracy on December 29, 2011.

----------------------------

NOTES:

[1] Vladislav Surkov, "Sistema uzhe izmenilas'," Izvestia (December 22, 2011). Available online at: (accessed 12/23/2011).

[2] "Die Politik bedeutet ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten Brettern mit Leidenschaft und Augenmaß zugleich," Max Weber, Politik als Beruf. München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1919, p. 66.

[3] BBC Monitoring, "Russian Protest Icon Navalnyy Discusses Plans, Ambitions in Marathon Interview," Ekho Moskvy Radio, December 26, 2011.

[4] Lucian Kim, "A Russian Fairy Tale for Christmas," http://lucianinmoscow.blogspot.com/, December 25, 2011,

[5] "Russian Protest Icon Navalnyy Discusses Plans."

[6] Nikita Belykh, "Chto mozhet delat' v Rossii odin gubernator?" Polit.Ru (June 3, 2011). Available online at: (accessed 6/3/2011).

[7] "Miting 'Za chestnye vybory-2'. Nikita Belykh prishel, otvetil," Gorod Kirov, http://www.gorodkirov.ru/article_view?a_id=23784#ixzz1hsBjKUBF, December 26, 2011.

Russia Blog Editors wish you a very happy new year! We hope that 2012 will be prosperous and successful for you in every possible way! Please, come back soon for more fresh content on Russia, Former Soviet Union, and U.S.-Russia relations.

There are several issues about democracy under discussion in Russia. One is corruption and the stories of major public officials, including V. Putin, enjoying lavish palaces--and owning them?--on a government salary. Powerful elected officials after a few years in any country often come to chafe under the limits to personal wealth that coexist with their much less limited public power. That resentment is the seedbed of public pilf in any country, and that seedbed is apparently well-watered in Russia now. The official typically thinks, "Why is it that I can make others rich, but get nothing for myself?" The public thinks, "If you don't like your job, quit!"
But Putin isn't quitting.

In America, presidents are limited to two four year terms, after which they get a reasonably large annual pension and office staff, plus a presidential library named after them. They also can cash in, or not, in the private sector, based on their friendships and name. That seems to suffice. Almost no US presidents are accused of personal enrichment while in office.)

A second issue is whether freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are truly honored in Russia today, or are they offered only as window dressing? In the past, protests were small and could be ridiculed and criticized officially for not following proper procedures for permits, etc. The size of the recent protests make such ridicule ridiculous itself, and thanks, perhaps to calmer voices in the Kremlin, the approach of mockery has been muted.

In short, the recent poor showing of Mr. Putin's United Russia party and the way the prime minister has been booed on occasion mark a humbling of a leader who is known for his arrogance. On the other hand, a humbler Putin might be just the ticket for electoral success next March. The protestors are only a small slice of a vast population and polls still show that Unite Russia, headed by Putin, is likely to win the coming Presidential elections. It's just that the Kremlin is being reminded that in a democracy the people are sovereign, and you can alienate them.

But that still leaves issue number three: the recent apparent electoral fraud. There have been a few firings and promises of investigations. But a truly confident regime would conduct real investigations, come to honest conclusions and admit fault as appropriate. That might do more to gain credibility for the regime than anything they could do right now.

Don't count on it anytime soon.

What one can say is that politics should not be criminalized (to use Mark Helprin's useful phrase). There may be some corrupt politicians in jail, but there are surely many more in prison on trumped-up charges, guilty mainly of threatening the political prospects of their opponents. In the popular view, courts treat elected officials more leniently than ordinary people. But the opposite is often the case if the official or former official is a dissident.

Thus, at its inception, missile defense had a fruitful purpose-to bring to a close the Cold War, i.e., the division of Europe into mutually antagonistic blocs. Reagan was so concerned that his plans for missile defense not destabilize the nuclear balance and thus deepen and prolong pan-European discord that he offered to share the technology with Moscow that was still the capital of the Soviet Union.

The Obama Administration, having launched its wise and admirable reset by canceling President Bush's plans to deploy a missile system on Russia's borders, has since revived that very bad idea, and thereby torpedoed one of its few solid foreign policy achievements. It plans to park elements of a missile defense system in Poland and Romania, prompting Russia's once and presumably future president Vladimir Putin to ask publicly: "So where is this reset?"

Sadly, Obama has shown himself unable to withstand the pressures of powerful lobbies and factions within his own party for empire-that is to say for the maintenance and expansion of our globe-girdling hive of compliant states.

Our impending insolvency may yet save us from this potentially disastrous course. Why disastrous? Because it thoroughly undoes the heroic and beneficent work of Reagan and Gorbachev who laid the groundwork for a new pan-European zone of security and economic cooperation stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok and embracing North America. They aimed to put a definitive end to the European civil war that dated back to the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and continued through World War II and the Cold War.

Many in U.S. foreign policy circles reject the notion that Russia can be a reliable partner ostensibly because it does not share our values. They have long made Putin out to be neo-Soviet, indeed Stalin reincarnate, and now feel justified in that laughably slanderous misconception on the strength of alleged voter fraud in the December 4th State Duma elections. What they fail to mention is that for the first time in the history of Russia a ruling party has been rebuked at the polls, effectively losing the election. A significant loss of support for United Russia was predictable; nevertheless, the government allowed a largely free (though clearly imperfect) process to proceed. When it takes office, the new State Duma will approximate to the real shape of public opinion, and will credibly serve as a legitimate forum for debate and political action.

Thus, Russia continues its long, sometimes halting, but inexorable march away from totalitarianism. America, meanwhile, continues to march in the opposite direction: once a free Republic, it strives for global strategic dominance, and pays a heavy toll in disregard for civil liberties as its bossy, unaccountable, and incorrigible elite throws its weight around in every nook and cranny of the globe. Our militarized foreign policy, the monopolistic duopoly of the Republican and Democratic parties, the ubiquity of embedded regime media (msnbc on the left and Fox News on the pseudo-right, for example) conspire to render the quaint, non-interventionist, commercial Republic of George Washington as remote and defunct as the lost world of Atlantis (unless Ron Paul wins, and/or the global economy crashes, and even then a restoration is far from certain).

The reset needs to be more than a temporary suspension of our efforts to strategically encircle Moscow as we extricate ourselves from interminable foreign wars. It needs to be the first step towards divesting ourselves of empire and constructing a new pan-European entente cordiale for the sake of the moral, cultural and spiritual renaissance of the Northern Hemispheric nations of greater Europe.

Pan-Europe will revive by recuperating the heritage of Athens, Rome, Jerusalem, and Constantinople or not at all. And this will happen only in accord with Russia. It will not happen otherwise.

Under Vladimir Putin, Russia, like the U.S.A. under Ronald Reagan, is back. Those of us who fought to relegate Marxism-Leninism to the ash heap of history did so in the hope and expectation that Russia would emerge from under the rubble of a failed ideology still breathing and conscious.

Americans should be proud of their contribution to Russia's revival, and work with Russia's leadership to fashion a new zone of economic and security cooperation spanning the Northern Hemisphere.

To this end, the 2012 Republican Party platform should contain a plank calling on Moscow to reaffirm the sovereignty of all former satellites and Soviet republics. At the same time, it should insist that NATO halt further expansion eastward, and desist from basing military forces, including missile systems, anywhere east of Germany.

Thus, the newest NATO members would have the benefit of Article 5 protection while post-Soviet Russia would achieve stability on its borders, thus allowing it to develop internally, and repair the damage of 70 years of Marxist-Leninist misrule. The path would then be open to a strategic partnership with Moscow -- much needed if pan-Europe is to meet the strategic challenges posed by a rising East Asia and resurgent Islamic extremism.

In addition, the U.S. should scrap any notion of deploying missile defenses in Europe pointed towards Russia, and instead opt for a joint U.S.-Russian system designed to defend against threats from rogue states -- if indeed it proceeds with missile defense at all.

Republican candidates for president should call for an agonizing reappraisal of American foreign policy with a view to pan-European solidarity rather that a global hegemony we do not need and cannot afford. We should have done this in the immediate wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, but never did. We must make up for lost time. The time to act is now.

James George Jatras is the former Foreign Policy Analyst, U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, former U.S. Foreign Service Officer

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of the Department of World Politics at the Moscow State University.

Anthony T. Salvia is the former Special Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (appointee of President Ronald Reagan)