The difference between Russia and Ukraine was, and still is, that in Russia the chances of disintegration, despite the local elites' aspirations, had no basis at the most fundamental level. After all, Russia is practically a mono-ethnic state, where 80 percent of the population are Russians and the rest are tied to them by economic, social, cultural, linguistic, family and plain historical bonds. That was the reason why the concerted efforts of Putin and his team to crush those centrifugal tendencies were an eventual success. These efforts might not be very democratic by the Western book, but his political line was absolutely democratic in this clear-cut sense: they were in accord with the unquestionable desire of the people of Russia to continue to exist as a united entity. This is why Putin enjoyed as president and continues to enjoy now an overwhelming approval rating despite the country's many economic and democratic shortcomings.

As we said earlier, Yanukovich's position is much tougher, and the reason should be clear to anyone with even basic background knowledge of what present-day Ukraine actually is. Like most ex-Soviet republics, it is a product of Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy. Within that framework, several quite heterogeneous entities were lumped together and dubbed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It comprised Little Russia (Malorossiya) proper, huge swathes of Novorossiya, or New Russia, colonized in the 18th century and after mostly by Russians from the inner governorships; to these were added in 1939 western Ukraine and, in 1954, the entirely Russian-populated Crimea (Nikita Khrushchev's sop to Ukrainian Communist Party bosses for their support in the political infighting then going on at the top after Stalin's death).

Thus there are enormous fundamental differences between Ukraine's various regions. Ethnic, religious, linguistic, and arguably most importantly, the historical makeup: while some Western Ukrainians fought on the Nazi side in World War II, the rest of the Soviet Ukrainians were with the Red Army. To these should be added sharp economic differences: nationalistic western Ukraine is largely backward and agricultural, while the bulk of present-day Ukraine's economic potential is centered in the Russian-speaking east and south.

All this warrants at least two conclusions: Yanukovich's move to restore the presidential-parliamentary political system was practically inevitable if his agenda includes keeping the country together; and even with the best will on his part, and with continued help from Russia, the success of his mission is by no means assured.

In conclusion, one cannot resist mentioning the most embarrassing miscalculation by the Bill Clinton and George Bush administrations that invested significant political, moral, and, albeit modest, financial capital in the futile attempts to hammer a wedge between Russia and Ukraine. Yanukovich, portrayed in the West as a villain, eventually won a resounding victory, while the heroes of the Orange Revolution once presented as beacons of freedom and democracy were totally rejected by the Ukrainians. This Western policy not only failed to bring any social or other improvements in the lives of Ukrainians, but actually derailed the process of Russia's integration with the West, which was in fact in an active phase after September 11, 2001.

It seems that the Barack Obama administration has drawn the right conclusions from those past mistakes. As a result we are witnessing clear signs of the resurrection of U.S.-Russian and definitely Russian-European rapprochement. No longer threatened by rivalry with Ukraine and conscious of the need for U.S. and European investments and know-how, Russia is making one encouraging step after another toward the West.

This article appeared first in Russia Profile.

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow and Professor of World Politics at Moscow State University.