The first one is close interaction in building a missile defense system, initially on European territory and eventually also on a global scale.

The second one envisages mixed anti-terrorist rapid reaction teams involving military units of Russia, the US, and possibly also other countries.

The best way to improve trust between countries is to make their armed forces brothers-in-arms, so to speak. Many East European countries and even some of the former Soviet republics have won support of the US public and Congress by sending their troops, albeit in token numbers, to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda in Iraq.

A few successful joint anti-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus or in Afghanistan would greatly improve the Russians' feelings about America, and the Americans' attitude toward Russia. In turn, this would help get through Congress certain bills, like the one on revoking the Jackson-Vanick Amendment, on ratifying START 3, Agreement 123 on cooperation in the area of nuclear engineering, and others.

If Russia and the US manage to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and set about creating joint missile defense systems in earnest, then all enemies of a reset in America and in Russia, whether on the right or on the left, will have to seek other employment. In that case the future of Russia-NATO relations will also be sealed once and for all. The most realistic, and also the most desirable and mutually beneficial scenario would be the kind of relationship based on coordination and joint actions within the framework of NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, and some other participants that may well volunteer to join the coalition.

In the historical perspective the idea of Russia joining NATO as a full member lived for a nanosecond, during euphoria in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. Unfortunately, at that time there was not one leader in the West strategically far-sighted enough to resolutely embrace and ultimately implement this idea. However, it should be said in all fairness that George Bush Sr. came very close to that when he uttered his famous and often quoted phrase about the "security arc from Vancouver to Vladivostok." His vice president Dan Quayle tried to sell a similar idea to the Russian elite, in particular when he came to Moscow in 1996. Who knows, the overall situation would probably have developed in quite a different way if Bush and Quayle had not lost the 1992 presidential election. But then both Clinton and Bush Jr. did their damnedest to kill for good the idea of Russia's accession to NATO.

Naturally, it would now be naïve to feel optimistic about such a coalition's chances. NATO, or rather the US itself, is in a state of direct rivalry with Russia over post-Soviet space. Every time a former Soviet republic takes a step toward Russia for reasons of security or even economic expediency, the West starts fretting and screaming about attempts to resurrect the empire.

Certain leading European states, such as Germany, France and Italy, see only too well that Russia no longer poses any threat to security, and that cooperating with it is far more profitable than quarrelling. But even those countries are still fairly skeptical about Medvedev's idea of a new structure of European security involving Russia as its inalienable part.

Both old and new Europe are clearly awaiting a plain signal from Washington whether they are to view this initiative seriously. Hopefully, Serdyukov and Gates, who prides himself on his degree in Slavic studies, will contrive to bring closer the moment for such a signal to be given.

Edward Lozansky is president of American University in Moscow.