This topic brings to mind the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) posted commentary (on January 22 and 26) about the recently deceased Roman Kupchinsky, who was a long time executive with that news organization. In more recent times, Kupchinsky was providing commentary for the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Politically, Kupchinsky reflected an overall perspective which contrasts from mainstream Russian positions. RFE/RL refers to him as a "Ukrainian patriot." In varying degrees, there are many Ukrainians who have different views from what he expressed. Like the mainstream Russian views, the Ukrainian opinions running counter to Kupchinsky's are underrepresented at a number of leading venues besides RFE/RL.

Agree or disagree, Kupchinsky's comments are worth reviewing. His views reflect one way of thinking within the Ukrainian community, as well as with some others.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's August 11, 2009 open letter to his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko was the primary focal point at an August 13 discussion featuring Kupchinsky. The venue for this engagement was the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation's Aha! Network. Georgia, NATO, the Russian language's status in Ukraine and the gas transit dispute were the subjects in Medvedev's open letter which Kupchinsky addressed. The late RFE/RL executive and Eurasia Daily Monitor contributor discussed some other matters that were not specifically referred to in Medvedev's open letter. Kupchinsky's discussion omitted Medvedev's references to the contentious issues of the division within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the World War II era Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Without much detail, the Holodomor was briefly mentioned in his talk.

Etiquette

Kupchinsky contended that Medvedev's open letter format to Yushchenko was unnecessarily provocative and indicated a lack of Russian respect for Ukraine's independence. Respect and the lack thereof concern a two way street. The varying differences of opinions on the former Communist bloc have exhibited respectful and not so respectful manners. Determining respect and the lack thereof can be heavily influenced by political stance and/or personal preference in style.

Kupchinsky did not seem to view some of Yushchenko's policies as unnecessarily provocative and disrespectful towards Russia. Referring to "Russified Ukrainians" as "a problem" (as stated by Kupchinsky during his discussion) is arguably on par with saying that Ukraine is an artificial and failed state, created by the Bolsheviks. This kind of discourse can divert attention away from substantively addressing thoughts related to topics like:

- the regions of Ukraine having different historical and cultural experiences, influencing some of the diverse political views in that former Soviet republic

- the development of a separate Ukrainian national identity on Soviet drawn boundaries

- post-Soviet Ukraine's economic challenges.

Russo-Ukrainian relations have a dynamic running counter to a lack of respect. This aspect serves as a positive building block. Russia officially recognizes Ukrainian nationhood, inclusive of Ukraine's Soviet drawn boundaries. The desire to see an improvement in Russo-Ukrainian relations partly explains why Ukraine has decided to choose a new president. This desire for better relations (perhaps) best explains why Medvedev's open letter quickly dissipated as a main topic of discussion.

Kupchinsky said that Medvedev's open letter might serve to boost Yushchenko's popularity in Ukraine. This did not happen, in a way indicating a good amount of Ukrainian apprehension for siding with Yushchenko on his differences with the Russian government. (As a reminder, Kupchinsky's Aha! Network appearance was shortly after the release of Medvedev's open letter.) Medvedev's open letter was motivated by Russian displeasure with Yushchenko's policies.

The sharp/unconventional approach to diplomacy is not a new found Russian invention. Several examples come to mind. At the Brandenburg Gate, there was Ronald Reagan's 1987 quip of "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall." During a 2006 press conference in Russia, George Bush and Vladimir Putin had a candid exchange. In earlier times, there came about the legend of the Zaporozhian Cossacks' terse response to the Ottoman Empire's Sultan (which for some goes in the category of wishing it was definitely stated, as opposed to being a probable myth).

Present Day Talking Points

Prior to Medvedev's open letter to Yushchenko - Kupchinsky observed that Medvedev did not appear to deal much with Ukrainian issues. Kupchinsky noted Medvedev's legal background, which has dealt with domestic issues. Upon becoming Russian president in 2008, Medvedev has undertaken the responsibility of dealing with international affairs. Hence, his becoming more involved with Russo-Ukrainian relations.

Concerning Russia's opposition to Ukraine's selling of arms to Georgia before the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Kupchinsky added that Israel was also involved with such military transactions. This led him to note that Medvedev did not issue an open letter of protest to the Israeli leader. That observation is in line with Kupchinsky's belief of Russia having a lack of respect towards Ukraine. Missing from his comparison with Israel are the other Russo-Ukrainian issues, which are not evident vis-à-vis Russia and Israel. In short, the Ukrainian government's interaction with the Georgian government was not the lone issue motivating Medvedev's open letter.

In relation to the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, Kupchinsky reasoned that Russia has not attacked Ukraine because such a military operation would be bloodier. He did not mention two key points on why there has not been a Russo-Ukrainian military conflict. Russo-Ukrainian differences do not include any territorial disputes. In comparison, the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic is entangled with disputed territories, coupled with the Georgian government's strike on South Ossetia - which prompted a Russian counterattack. (Russian peacekeepers have been stationed in South Ossetia.)

Regarding the language situation in Ukraine (where Ukrainian is the sole official language), Kupchinsky referred to the Ukrainian language's status in Russia. On this comparison (as well as Kupchinsky's reference to Israel), one can not help but (yet again) recall the "whataboutism" term, whose origin seems to be (possibly) related to the negative portrayal of pro-Russian advocates making analytical comparisons. In terms of popularity, the number of people in Russia frequently using Ukrainian as a primary language is considerably less than the number of individuals in Ukraine utilizing the Russian language on a regular basis. Missing from Kupchinsky's discussion is a reference to the officially multilingual countries, whose language policy is due to the sort of linguistic reality in Ukraine.

On Ukraine becoming a member of NATO, Kupchinsky pointedly stated the opinion that this is Ukraine's right and choice, which Russia has no business opposing. Not mentioned, is the lack of Ukrainian public support for NATO membership, in line with the leading Ukrainian presidential candidates' non-support of Yushchenko's pro-NATO membership stance.

Kupchinsky said that the Russian government is using "nationalism" to take attention away from domestic problems. He stressed this view with a reference to the Kremlin's differences with the Ukrainian, Georgian and Baltic governments. Kupchinsky did not discuss the anti-Russian nationalism evident among some elements in Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) - countries with domestic problems. The simultaneous highlighting of Russian nationalism and downplaying of anti-Russian nationalism underscores a prevailing bias, which goes unchallenged in some circles. (For accuracy sake, responsible patriotism should not be equated with chauvinism.)

In the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute, Kupchinsky viewed Russia as the party primarily at fault. Mikhail Krutikhin's February 2009 article at the web site of the European Union Institute for Security Studies takes issue with some of the claims made by Kupchinsky.

Viewing the Past and Present

During the question and answer segment of Kupchinsky's discussion, someone gave a series of editorialized comments and questions that can be taken as pro-Crimean Tatar/anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalist. In his own words, the mentioned individual said that the Crimean Tatar community has been in general agreement with the anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalists. The person in question portrayed the Russian majority in Crimea as the instigator of tensions in that region. He added that Russians from outside of Crimea have contributed to these tensions.

Such a characterization has been credibly directed at some Ukrainian nationalists from outside that region. Within Crimea, The Washington Post's Philip Pan noted that the region's Russian and Ukrainian communities generally get along well with each other. In actuality, the dispute in Crimea between some Tatars and Slavs is not a matter of total or near total provocation of the latter. When compared to some other former Communist bloc ethnic disputes, Crimea's predicament has been limited.

Over the course of time, Crimea has experienced confrontation between the Slav and Tatar communities. Part of Crimean territory became affiliated with the state of Rus. Later on, the Tatars settled in Crimea, where a slave trade against Slavs and some others took effect. Crimea became part of the Russian Empire in 1783. During World War II, the Crimean Tatars were exiled and interned by the Soviet government, under very harsh conditions. The reason for this treatment (having to do with an ethically challenged notion of collective loyalty during war) is akin to what Japanese-North Americans faced at the same time. (The latter had much better conditions, due to the more desirable wartime socioeconomic circumstances in North America and the different political situation between the Soviet Union and North America.)

After the Soviet Union's demise, a number of the exiled Crimean Tatar families sought to live in Crimea. Upon arriving to that region, they have received some assistance from the Ukrainian government and are supported by anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalists. The Tatars currently comprise under 15% of Crimea's population.

Kupchinsky broadly characterized a corruptly run Crimean region in need of greater central control. The level of corruption is relative to what exists in some other parts of the former Communist bloc. At times, the commentary on corruption can be partly influenced by the given slant of the source. If the geopolitics of the area in question is not preferred, the subject of corruption provides a convenient talking point. On the whole, how does Crimea's population view its regional government in comparison to the central authorities? The advocacy to have the autonomous Crimean region centralized seems motivated on the yearning to limit pro-Russian sympathies. An attempt to curtail Crimea's autonomy might result in the sort of opposition that can increase instability. Throughout the world, the concept of autonomy for historically/culturally unique regions within nations is supported as a medium, in place of outright independence, or centralized control.

Near the end of his discussion, Kupchinsky links Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa's turning against Czar Peter the Great, with the suggestion that present day Russia looks at this historical occurrence as a premise to not trust modern day Ukraine. Somebody else communicated to me his impression that Mazepa miscalculated, in a way that is somewhat similar to some more recent Ukrainian experiences. Further elaboration correlates how throughout history, a number of Ukrainian political figures faced considerable internal opposition to their domestic and geopolitical aims. (Such leaders include Symon Petliura and Stepan Bandera, along with Mazepa and Yushchenko).

Mazepa grew up under Polish rule and a Jesuit education. He later became a trusted ally of Peter in part of the territory that was to become affiliated with modern day Ukraine. In the rift between Russia and Sweden and the latter's militarily lesser ally Poland, Mazepa chose to side against Peter. This move has been interpreted as being influenced on the supposition that the Swedish side would end up victorious against Russia. A contributing factor to Sweden's defeat and Mazepa's demise was the lack of support they each had in the territory of what became contemporary Ukraine. Instead, many inhabitants of that land opted to side with Peter.

Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic.