Anatoly Karlin's optimism is admirable.
However, Russia is busy invading and subduing its neighbors, spending on nuclear weapons and army, sparring with the West and alienating the North Caucasus. In addition, Russia is strengthening autocracy, beurocracy, corruption and ethnic intollerance. Russia's resources are not unlimited. It cannot do all of above and improve its demography at the same time, particularly when the priorities are somewhere else, but not in improving demography.

@ZviadKavteli

I think you have the wrong country.

America Latino population is increasing while the white majority is projected to be a minority by 2050. It’s waging war in Muslim countries and terminology like "Islamofacists" and aid to Israel during the Gaza offensive angering 1.5 billion Muslims and with the election of Obama pro-white activism is increasing

Invading what neighbours the EU's own investigation proclaimed that Georgia was responsible for starting the war in Georgia although it is to cowardly to investigate the role of the US in the affair.

Ukraine is in much more trouble than Russia no thanks to the presidents policies were the GDP was actually increasing before he came to power, involvement in Georgia conflict which Georgia and promoting right wing anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism alienating the large Eastern ethic Russian population that Russia can always encourage to immigrate to Russia with economic incentives.

"First, fertility expectations today are little different from those of the late Soviet era, when the TFR was still relatively healthy. According to numerous surveys since the early 1990s, Russians consistently say they want to have an average of 2.5 children. This is broadly similar to respondents from the British Isles, France and Scandinavia, who have relatively good TFR’s of around 1.7-2.1."

Actually, that's irrelevant. This paper, analyzing 2001 Eurobarometer data

http://user.demogr.mpg.de/goldstein/publications/goldstein_lutz_testa.pdf

suggests that even though women in many countries want to have significantly more children than the replacement rate, this does not correlate to a strong fertility rate. Younger women in Spain, Italy, Portugal and especially Greece all report that they'd prefer their families to have at least two children, but in actual fact TFRs--and likely cohort fertility--are substantially lower.

There's a cluster of countries--France and the Low Countries, the British Isles, and a greater Norden that includes ethnic Estonians--where high cohort fertility is consistently maintained, with births delayed but replacement-level fertility ultimately recuperated.

In the rest of Europe, in contrast, the delay in childbearing isn't compensated for by a sufficient number of children. In the specific case of post-Communist Europe, the average ages of marriage and first childbirth are low--recuperation may be possible. _May_ be possible. The severity of the current economic crisis suggests that cohort fertility will probably be depressed, as women postpone parenthood.

@Randy,

I'm aware that real fertility in industrialized nations tends to be 0.5-1.0 children less than desired fertility, yet are are two caveats to this argument:

1) If the desired fertility is substantially higher in one country than in another, then in the long term it is rational to expect that its real fertility will also be bigger, on average. Consider, for instance, that Germany's and Austria's desired TFR is around 1.7-1.8; their real fertility is around 1.4. This implies that they have no chance of attaining or even reaching close to replacement level fertility in the absence of a major values shift.

In Russia's case, to the contrary (and as in the Baltics and presumably Ukraine), desired fertility is not the limiting factor in reaching replacement-level TFR, since it hovers at around 2.5.

2) I think the crucial issue is really the ABS, which is currently at around 1.6-1.7. Assuming that as before 90% of women end up having children, this implies that the "natural" long-term TFR rate is at around 1.4-1.5 - i.e., the figures seen since 2007.

Of course the fact that births were postponed and artificially low during the transition period means that it is likely the TFR will actually exceed the ABS rate for part of the 2010's, so as to compensate for the 1993-2006 "deficit".

Re-the Med. One reason could be that these countries have lost their economic dynamism. Another is that attitudes towards women in them remain highly traditional, which paradoxically curbs rather than helps fertility. Another more exotic reason is that people in those countries have a subconscious sense of becoming overpopulated (is it really an accident that the two rich nations with the healthiest demographies, France and the US, also have comparatively low population densities?). It should be noted that Russia is arguably not affected by any of these factors to as big an extent as the countries of Med Europe.

Re-crisis. Yes, it will probably dent Russia's demography in the short term (as I wrote here - http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2009/05/22/russian-resilience/), but the effect is unlikely to be big, and so far the statistics are bearing me out (http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b09_00/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d05/8-0.htm).

@ Sublime Oblivion:

There's no reason why cohort fertility in Germany and Austria has to reach replacement levels. There's no reason why eastern Europe has to do that.

It's worth noting that long-standing differences in family structure seem to have produced durable differences. I refer particularly to this paper

http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=51458

which points out that since the 1950s, ethnic Estonians and Russophones have demonstrated different demographic dynamics, characterized by notably higher fertility and lower mortality than their Russophone counterparts. Implementing the lessons of Finnish Karelia throughout the former Soviet Union--not just Estonia--may be difficult.

As for Mediterranean Europe, I'm not sure that I buy your examples. Poland and Russia have lower population densities than France and the United States, yet have substantially lower cohort fertility. As for Mediterranean economies and gender roles, sure local economies aren't booming they way that they used to, but they're still qutie wealthy. Some regions, like northern Italy and Catalonia, are as wealthy as any in the European Union, but that isn't evidenced in higher fertility rates. As for gender roles, is Russia really that much better? The legal infrastructure in Mediterranean Europe for women is certainly well-developed, if nothing else.

Finally, even if Russia does settle at a cohort fertility of ~1.6 children per woman, absent immigration--always a possibility--that's still going to lead to an eventual 20% decline in population.
Mediterranean

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Russia

@Randy,

Re-Germany/eastern Europe. Though you are right both have no intrinsic reason to increase their TFR back to above replacement levels, I would argue that such an outcome (or coming close) is rather more likely in the region which has a desired fertility of 2.4-2.6 (Russia, France, UK, Scandinavia inc Estonia) or 2.1-2.3 (Visegrad), than the one with 1.7-1.8 (Germany / Austria).

Re-Estonia. We discussed this at SWP - here is my reply to these points. Though it is true that ethnic Estonians had lower mortality and higher fertility rates than Russophones throughout the Soviet and transition periods in Estonia, the differences are in magnitude rather than kind. Estonians too suffered from significant levels of hyper-mortality amongst middle-aged men and an artificially depressed TFR during the transition. In particular, I would quote this reply of mine from our discussion there:

"“Briefly put, in a large variety of settings, including environments where Russophones/Russians enjoy relatively greater prosperity than other conationals (Ukraine, Central Asia) or are absolutely richer and live in stabler environments than in Russia (Latvia, Estonia), Russians still haven’t responded with either a baby boom or decreased mortality. ” - Randy

1. Many of these Russians are almost urban workers, and in some cases like the Baltics and especially Central Asian countries, have lost great numbers of people from their young, reproductive-age cohorts.

2. For Russophones, living in what are essentially foreign countries cannot be good for morale, especially in certain Baltic nations whose “stabler environments” are based on linguistic, cultural and political oppression of Russophones as has been documented by HR organizations like Amnesty International.

3. In Russia itself, there is a rich region, Khanty-Mansi, which is 66% Russia and is significantly ahead of the rest of Russia in economic development. In 2007 the TFR was at 1.66; BR = 14.6 and DR = 7.0, and further improved substantially in 2008. These figures are quite respectable, and indicative that in economic prosperity and a developed healthcare system will probably substantially improve its demography."

Re-overpopulation. Poland and Russia's problems are due to the transition shock. That said, perhaps I shouldn't have used "population density" but rather the carrying capacity of the land. Though huge, Russia's landmass can almost certainly support anywhere near as many people as China or India, because of its climatic and geographic features. But this is not a rigorous theory, of course...just a matter for speculation.

Re-Russian women. There is a more balanced and comparative exploration of the issue on the Global Gender Gap site. Russia had a rating of 0.69 there (the higher the more equal), which does not compare particularly unfavorably with the major Western countries - Germany 0.76, UK / Spain 0.74, US 0.70, France / Poland 0.68, Italy / Japan 0.65.

Re-constant TFR of 1.6 - yes, in that case Russia's population will eventually decline by 20%, and will continue doing so. But a) positing no immigration is unrealistic, given past trends and the fact that global warming is going to increase Russia's carrying capacity, and b) this decline is going to occur slowly and over decades, which should be manageable (unlike the case where the TFR falls and stays at 1.2).

I don't think you understand my point re: Estonia. During the 1950-1990 period, when Estonia was firmly part of the Soviet Union and Russophone culture was dominant, Estonian women consistently gave birth to more children--at an above-replacement level--than their Russian counterparts. Estonian population growth was driven by natural increase; Russophone, by immigration.

Yes, there was a mortality shock following the transition that affected both populations. It affected the ethnic Estonian population significantly less than the Russophone, and the ethnic Estonian population has recovered earliest. It's worth noting that Estonia has the highest TFR

http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/54770.php

of any of the European ex-Soviet Republics.

I hear your point about Khanty-Mansi, but how does a population of 1.4M necessarily determine the future. Utah's fertility rate is substantially elevated above the American average, but does that necessarily mean that the US will converge to Utah's level? Maybe Utah's just an outlier.

Carrying capacity. An Italy that's highly developed, with fully modern telecommunications and transport systems, modern industry and housing, and a stable government has a very high carrying capacity--60M most recently--that's much higher than (say) the more hospitable regions of the Far East or far eastern Poland.

In any case, fertility and mortality among Russians--perhaps Russophones more broadly--seems to be consistently lower/higher than is the case in closely related populations (ethnic Estonians and Latvians, Poles and other central Europeans, people in the Caucasus, et cetera). This difference has proved to be durable, and in the case of Estonia dates back at least as far as the 1950s. (Note the reports of very high birthrates in Ukrainophone western Ukraine, too.)

Desired children surveys have consistently recorded higher numbers of children desired than actually born on account of decisions made elsewhere/when. In Russia's case, with an economy shrinking by 10% on top of ongoing crises in hypermortality and low living standards, a substantial difference between claimed desires and actual reality seems safe. (The same elsewhere, of course; the French are concerned that their high cohort fertility might be dented.)

Re-Estonia. Your link shows the Estonian TFR reached 1.5 in 2005, which is higher but not massively so than Russia (1.3 in 2006, 1.4 in 2007, approximately 1.45-1.50 in 2008). And whereas a big drop in Russia's TFR during the recession is possible (in contrast to a slight drop, which is very likely), the big drop is ALREADY happening in Estonia and Latvia.

http://easterneuropeeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/03/why-you-need-devaluation-open-letter-to.html

Indeed Statistics Latvia have already reported a 25% year-on-year drop in births in January 2009 (from 2310 in Jan 2008 to 1860 in Jan 2009), and looking at the Estonian Statistics we find that in January 2008 there were 1493 births and in January 2009 there were 1232. Again about a 20% drop year on year. Of course, one month's data don't prove anything, but since, as Doug points out, this is what the theory predicts, we should all be taking it seriously, and it should be taken into consideration when we talk about which kind of "correction" we want. It is no good saving the stream of external funding coming into your banks if you "meltdown" your population as you do it.

Also, re-historical data, I found stuff which contradicts your assertion that Estonia had a higher fertility than Russians during USSR.

http://iussp2009.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=91919

For many
years, Estonia and Latvia were the two republics in the former USSR with the lowest fertility
rates. The period total fertility rate (TFR) fluctuated between 1.7 and 1.9 for a considerable
time, but in the mid - 1960s it dropped to 1.7 births per woman...After such changes in all three Baltic States in mid-1980s an approximately equal level of fertility rate was reached and there was simple generational replacement during that period of time.

On the positive side, the post-Soviet decline wasn't really structural as such and as in Russia was primarily driven by birth postponement, with the "natural" rate estimated at a similar 1.65-1.85.

Re-KM. It is a typical Russian region, only much richer than most - hence it can serve as a portal into Russia's future (assuming its economy continues converging to developed status). Utah is not a typical American state, quite clearly, because of its Mormon character.

Re-carrying capacity. Let's leave this to another day. It was an afterthought which I don't feel like arguing.

Re-mortality. No disputing its worse amongst Russophones than amongst their neighbors - but this is a matter of magnitude, not kind. Ethnic Estonians, etc, also suffered from a transition hypermortality shock.

Re-W. Ukraine. The three far western provinces with high TFR's (well, high by European standards anyway - they're at around 1.8-1.9) have a small population (so they're not important) and are rural in character (rural areas in Russia too have significantly higher TFR's than urban areas, sometimes approaching replacement levels).

"No disputing its worse amongst Russophones than amongst their neighbors - but this is a matter of magnitude, not kind. Ethnic Estonians, etc, also suffered from a transition hypermortality shock."

Definitely. But ethnic Estonians suffered the least.

As for the Estonian TFR, it's important to note that this is the average for both the Estonian and the Russophone populations. If ~30% of the population has a TFR below the national average, this means that ~70% has a TFR above the national average, i.e. that TFRs among ethnic Estonians are substantially closer to Nordic levels than to post-Soviet ones.

This makes sense since Estonia, unlike Russia, is located to the east of the Hajnal line

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hajnal_line

which is characterized by late marriage, relatively low but stable fertility, and relatively greater equality between women and men as determined by things like age differences. Estonia's Russophone population, produced almost entirely by immigration from east of the Hajnal line over the past sixty years, hasn't absorbed ethnic Estonian practices.

"Re-KM. It is a typical Russian region, only much richer than most - hence it can serve as a portal into Russia's future (assuming its economy continues converging to developed status)."

As for Khanty-Mansi, it's not obvious that it's a typical Russian region on account of it being an oil-rich region that has absorbed very large numbers of immigrants. Increased wealth might encourage women who would otherwise have delayed their first childbirth to birth their first child at an earlier age, but that's a might--Russian women, like eastern European women broadly speaking give birth to children early at any rate.

As for TFRs, certainly the Baltic States--including Estonia--had TFRs equal to or below that of Russia. What I'm saying is that TFRs among ethnic Estonians, at least, were more resilient and durable than among Russophones.

Think of it this way. Over the 1871-1939 period, the German population grew much more quickly than the French, with both countries having a bit more than 35 million people in 1871 but the gap widening to 60 million Germans versus 40 million French by the beginning of the Second World War.

Despite this historically higher birth rate, though, in recent years the German birth rate has crashed, such that fertility is far below replacement levels and (as of now) there are more births in France than in Germany even though the German population is one-third larger.

http://demoblography.blogspot.com/2007/06/number-of-births-in-france-germany.html

What's up with this? As the below link describes

http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol14/14/14-14.pdf

there are serious differences between French and West German fertility rates rooted in basic differences in the role and status enjoyed by women in the two societies as well as the wider economic environment and fairly well-established differences in family construction.

My argument is that ethnic Estonian family, et cetera, structures are such that fertility is substantially more able to withstand the shock of post-Soviet adjustment than those of Russophones, in addition to providing a greater buffer against higher mortality.

Speaking to the point of this post, I'd argue that there are serious differences between Russophone and non-Russophone fertility and mortality, within the ex-Soviet Union and in comparison to the European Union, and that these differences will remain durable for some time to come.

"Despite this historically higher birth rate, though, in recent years the German birth rate has crashed, such that fertility is far below replacement levels and (as of now) there are more births in France than in Germany even though the German population is one-third larger."

I think the main thing the France-Germany story proves - and I used this exact same example at the beginning of my earlier and longer article Rite of Spring: Russia Fertility Trends - is that demographic trends are innately unpredictable and what is true today may not be true tomorrow.

For instance, French fertility rates may fall as their Muslim rates continue converging to indigenous levels; on the other hand, German rates may rise because the people who had no propensity to have children pass their childbearing ages and only the children from more "patriarchal" families will come to dominate amongst youth. Or none of this may happen.

So let's agree to disagree (and agree!) on different points.