Grigory Yavlinsky, the most prominent liberal in Russian politics (photo by AP)
Bush-Putin Meeting. Contrary to expectations, there appears to have been no breakthrough on the contentious issues of NATO expansion or missile defense at the Russian President's retreat in Sochi.
Hubris and the Limits of Russia's Revival. There is no doubt that Putin’s two terms have been remarkably successful: eight years ago, many observers were ready to write Russia off completely (examples here, here, and here) and Putin (with some help from higher world commodity prices) has managed to improve Russia's leading economic and social indicators. But nevertheless Russia is not really very strong: its GDP is still somewhere around the same as Canada’s (even with four or five times the population); poverty is widespread; Russian infrastructure is inadequate; corruption is omnipresent; its economic importance is principally as an energy supplier; its armed forces, though large, are not very competitive; it has no real allies; and most of its neighbours would prefer it to be located somewhere else.
Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov marching with party members
Photo by Xinhua News Agency
The NATO Obsession. NATO will continue to expand despite (and maybe because of ) Moscow’s objections. Moscow’s hoping for “multilateral world” in which it is an important player is mostly a dream. There remains a reflexively anti-Russian flavor in almost all Western commentary – eight years ago Russia was viewed as dangerously weak, now it is dangerous because it is reasserting itself on the global stage. In short, to use the Soviet expression, the correlation of forces does not favor Moscow. I don’t think the Kremlin really understands this and overestimates its influence.
I also think that after eight long years, Putin is tired and testy: tired of his every warning (like his latest about how divisive an issue NATO membership is in Ukraine) being spun into a threat by the Western media and testy about all the times he’s been ignored (like the times before 9/11 he tried to tell the West about the common threat of jihadism). Putin carries the baggage of these rebuffs as well as the fearful memory of the fragile country he inherited. Presumably he is now going to focus on domestic affairs and leave foreign policy to the youthful Medvedev, who may bring a more relaxed point of view to the job.
Novye Izvestia had a piece in which a number of graduates of the USA-Canada Institute (which played, I believe, an important role in the early Gorbachev period, arguing, among other things, that the USSR was not made more secure by frightening its neighbours) recommend that Moscow stop obsessing about NATO expansion. This seems to me to be good advice. NATO, with 26 veto-wielding members, or whatever it is now (is Albania in yet?), is unlikely to be an effective organisation and there is nothing Moscow can do anyway.
Russian Opposition in Disarray. The opposition held two conferences this weekend to talk about uniting. The liberals (minus Yabloko: Yavlinskiy issued a decree against Yabloko members merging with “supra-party structures”) met in St Petersburg and the left wing opposition (minus the Communists) met in Moscow. Each group talked about uniting among themselves and then with each other. I doubt there will be much of a result. For what it’s worth the Communist Party is the only opposition party left commanding serious support in Russia.
Russian Politics. United Russia has formed three “informal political clubs” which this week received some recognition from the party structure. One will apparently focus on business, one on social matters and the third on patriotic issues. Some see this as a step towards splitting United Russia into three parties, although the official line is that it’s just a means of discussing Russia’s future.
In the last 15 years, I would argue that no new Russian political party has arisen, if we define a party as an organization having a clear stance on issues, a presence across the country and success in elections. The Communists qualify (thanks to their inheritance of their faithful Soviet constituency), Yabloko might qualify (but is losing on the last), the Liberal Democratic Party is just a vehicle for its flamboyant leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and United Russia is still a grouping of power-seekers and power-supplicants. The liberal parties cannot and will not unite. The center may be trying to create three parties out of United Russia but I’m sceptical that such a thing can be done. And, its last attempt, Just Russia, is still in existence. Political parties take a long time to evolve.
Presidential Terms in Russia. There is a certain amount of speculation about increasing the president’s term. There are two anomalies in the Russian system at the moment. State Dumas are elected every fourth December but the presidential term can change when incumbents resign (as Yeltsin did) or die. There is no vice president to fill out the term (perhaps not surprisingly given that both Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s vice presidencies led to coup attempts). The two election periods are close to each other and many Russians fear that this puts too much strain on the system. Some think a longer term may be a better idea. It takes time before a political system settles down and Russia isn’t finished yet (and some countries never quite do – political stability is actually rather rare).
Russian NGOs. The Public Chamber has asked the Federal Registration Service to simplify the process under which NGOs must register. Either by intention or love of bureaucratic obfuscation, the process remains long and very opaque.
Patrick Armstrong received a PhD from Kings College, University of London, England in 1976 and began working for the Canadian government as a defence scientist in 1977. He was Political Counsellor for the Canadian Embassy in Moscow from 1993 to 1996. He has been a frequent speaker at the Wilton Park conferences in the UK.
