A major branch of this industry, inflating by the minute in view of “problem 2008,” belabors the issue of, Will he or won’t he? Seek a third term in office, what else. There is a subdivision here: If he will not – who is most likely to succeed him? High time someone ran a tote on this, for the stakes are quite high. Much higher than in guessing which quadruped will run faster than the next.

Just as with quadrupeds, there is an exciting element of guesswork here, despite the evidence of form books and such. Some guesses are astute, others ridiculous, still others idiotic – all in a day’s work, or game. When I edited intelligent.ru (defunct now, in case you have not noticed), a certain political scientist wrote a lengthy article for it to prove that Russia’s next president would be Mr. Vladimir Yakunin, president of Russia’s Railways. The point was so thoroughly argued, and with such aplomb, that I now prick up my ears whenever I see Mr. Yakunin perform on TV. He does seem, judging by those appearances entirely, like an intelligent guy with a firm grasp on the job in hand, but – presidential material? I can only shrug my shoulders fit to dislocate one or both of them.

Still, there is a school of thought among Russia pundits, mostly abroad, that holds that Putin is keeping some unknown card up his sleeve, an heir presumptive whose name he will throw in at the eleventh hour: “Most insiders suspect there will be a last-minute stealth candidate, in keeping with how Putin himself emerged and how he operates” (see “Russia under Putin: Democracy or Dictatorship?” by Stephen Kotkin, 7 March 2007).

I do not have access to the secret suspicions of “most insiders,” or any insiders for that matter (I strongly suspect that neither has Mr. Kotkin). I am aware, though, that this is 2007 and will soon be 2008, not 1999; that Mr. Putin is not Mr. Yeltsin, nor does he “operate” like the latter – rather the reverse, judging by the results the two men have achieved; and that there is simply no need for Vladimir Putin to spring any dark horse on an apathetic electorate that would welcome the devil himself just to be rid of the incumbent, of whom the said electorate was sick and tired to the point of nausea and beyond.

There are several quite obvious things that Mr. Putin is doing on this issue of “succession.” These things are there for all to see and draw conclusions from, and it is not Mr. Putin’s fault that pundits prefer to invent more pundit-like, convoluted schemata, to bolster their reputations for acuity in the spin business.

Point one: Putin keeps saying, or rather trying to drum into his listeners’ consciousness, that Russia has got to learn the basics of democracy, including respect for the Constitution; that he will not therefore succumb to the entreaties of either the broad public or sections of the elite that have done particularly well during his tenure to seek a third term in office. No use drawing parallels with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four terms; all that is journalist talk, Russia in the early 21st century is not USA in the 20th, and he will step aside come 2008, whatever the 32nd US president may have done in his time.

Point two: Putin says that he does not intend to appoint his successor. There is indeed absolutely no need for him to make any dramatic announcements on New Year’s Eve, like his predecessor did in a move that had the country so delighted with his stepping down that it swallowed the “successor” bit (although this writer is on record as expressing at the time his rather fierce disgust not just with such an undemocratic procedure but also with Mr. Putin for going along with it). Right now Mr. Putin merely reserves the right – vouchsafed to any citizen of Russia – to express his preference for someone whom he would like to see as the country’s next president. If lots of people follow his tip, well, that’s the people’s own business. Nothing undemocratic about a personal opinion – everyone is entitled to it.

Point three: Putin is putting into positions of prominence and responsibility valued members of his team, particularly Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, where they have lots of public exposure and where their success or failure at their highly important, crucial tasks is there for all to see. That’s a far cry from undemocratic tricks like unexpectedly throwing Mr. Kotkin’s, or his mythical insiders’ “stealth candidates” into the works. Practically the whole electorate has ringside seats right now, so there is a good case for Vladimir Putin’s assertion that it is the people of Russia who will decide what president they want.

As matters stand at the moment, lots of people in the Russian street have already made their decision (or so I hear as I keep my ear to the ground): Sergei Ivanov for president (he has had more exposure to international affairs and looks and acts more “paternal”); Dmitry Medvedev for premier (he is younger and has more of the air of a technocrat about him). As we say in Russian, vozmozhny varianty “other scenarios are possible” (some point to Foreign Minister Lavrov as a presidential possibility), but a “stealth candidate” is not one of them. In this situation, only the self-appointed, mostly Transatlantic Russia watchers, pundits etc. may feel that nagging need for a “stealth candidate.” One wonders why – to make Russia appear more of a political jungle than it really is, perhaps? To bolster their cherished view of Putin as a grey KGB colonel with his sinister, KGB ways?

In the situation as it is shaping up in reality, not in some analysts’ fevered imagination, I would say that Putin will not even need to announce his preference for a specific individual. He may just say, “Dear voters, dear deeply respected people of Russia! I have put enough capable men in the limelight; you have seen them tested in serving your interests, so please make your choice, free and fair.”

Privately, he may feel completely confident that the choice will be as indicated above. If it is, the people of Russia will feel satisfied that things will not slip back to the 1990s sort of shambles. The Putin regime will continue without Putin in his present slot, the transition will be accomplished smoothly, without upheavals, bloody strife, August 1998-like “defaults,” “sovereignty parades,” or the like. And that’s democracy enough for Russia at the present stage.

The question remains, of course, what Mr. Putin himself is going to do in his afterlife, and how Russian democracy will evolve from its current state. There are some promising possibilities there. I hope to discuss them in a separate piece.